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Idiosyncratic Risk and Risk Taking Behavior of Mutual Funds Managers 
 
Gao Wang 
 
Abstract 
 
I propose that various measures of mutual funds’ performance are more consistent with their 
investment capability when mutual funds present low idiosyncratic risks.  This paper finds 
conditional predictor for funds’ returns: alpha predicts returns positively for low idiosyncratic 
risk funds. It suggests that mutual funds which showed high alpha and low idiosyncratic risk 
in the past may be capable in investment. Their performance is consistently higher than funds 
with low idiosyncratic risk and low alpha. On the other hand, the performance of high 
idiosyncratic risk funds is more likely to reverse in the future:  expected returns are low for 
high alpha funds, and low alpha funds’ expected returns are high. I split the sample into 3 
categories: funds with high idiosyncratic risk, low idiosyncratic risk and low alpha, low 
idiosyncratic risk and high alpha. Following Barras, Scaillet and Wermer(2010)’s method, I 
find out that the proportion of zero-alpha fund is highest within high idiosyncratic risk funds, 
and low alpha low idiosyncratic risk funds include the most unskilled funds. This paper also 
studies the predictive power of a variety of fund characters: alpha, idiosyncratic risk exposure, 
information ratio, and so on. However, none of them shows clear predictive pattern for 
expected returns. My observation reveals that information ratio does not predict returns in the 
full sample, but it indeed has strong predictive power for funds which keep long term growth, 
or growth and income investment objective. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Institutional investors are now a dominant force in financial markets, representing a large 
fraction of equity ownership and an even larger proportion of trading volume. Equity mutual 
funds hold more than 70% shares on stock market in United States. Presently, both 
academicians and practitioners face a problem on how to select the funds with persistent 
outperformance. Recent studies, like Kosowski et al. (2006), Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) 
and Avramov and Wermers (2006), indicate that some fund managers may possess the 
investment capability. They document the outperformance by some funds, and argue that 
actively management does add value to mutual fund investment
1. On the other hand, Carhart 
(1997) and several papers find zero returns or negative performance, net of trading cost and 
management expenses. Barras, Scaillet and Wermer (2010) further document that nearly 75% 
of the population exhibit zero-alpha all through their life time. Less than 1% is skilled fund 
managers who possess the “hot hand” to invest. 
There is a large body of researches on unconditional predictor for funds’ expected returns. 
Amihud and Goyenko (2009) indicate that the R square computed from the 4-factor 
regression negatively predicts future returns across the whole sample. Their result is 
consistent with Cremer and Petajisto’s (2009) findings on effect of selectivity, which also 
document positive relation between active investment strategy and expected performance. 
Brand, Brown and Gallagher (2005) find similar pattern that their divergence index predicts 
fund performance positively
2. Their story is straightforward: low R square and high 
divergence index proxy active management. And actively managed mutual funds create 
                                                            
1 Amihud and Goyenko (2009) use R-square to measure the active management, and their result is also 
supportive for the idea that active management adds to the value. 
2 The divergence index is defined as the sum of squared deviations of the fund portfolio’s stock weights from 
the market portfolio. 2 
 
significant profit to investors. The behavior interpretation is that, for one thing, active 
management may proxy the ambition and capability of the fund managers. Managers will 
expand their risk exposure when they are certain about the investment opportunity; for 
another, past loser may manually increase their portfolio volatility, under the pressure of cash 
outflow or tournament effect. 
Although the active management predicts the expected returns positively, it may not be a 
reliable proxy for investment ability. Investors may care more about their risk bearing under 
some market condition
3. Trusts and pension funds have more rigorous restriction on risk 
controlling over profit earning. Actually, for a long time investors use Sharpe Ratio 
(abnormal return over return volatility) to access the performance of institutional investors. 
Information ratio (abnormal return over idiosyncratic volatility) also proxies fund managers’ 
profiting capability while manage the risk in controllable level
4. Treynor and Black (1973) 
show that an optimally constructed risky portfolio P, composed of a passive index portfolio 
M and an active investment portfolio A, has the following Sharpe ratio: 
2
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where  A alpha  and  A RMSE   are measured with respect to the passive index M. Thus, the 
contribution of mutual fund A to the Sharpe ratio of the investor’s portfolio is increasing in 
the fund’s Information Ratio. This means that a higher Information Ratio makes the fund 
more attractive to investors. Information Ratio has been used as performance measure by 
Brands, Brown and Gallagher (2005) and by Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005). 
                                                            
3 Quite a number of behaviour researches document that investors are more sensitive to volatility when market 
goes down. 
4 Bodie, Kane and Markus (2009) show that the larger is the information ratio, the greater is the demand for the 
fund. 3 
 
This paper studies the predictive power for both Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio. 
Abnormal return is the alpha from Carhart’s (1997) 4-factor based model. And idiosyncratic 
risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression above (root 
mean square error). We conduct the tests on both whole sample and sub-samples based on 
different investment objectives
5. The result is consistent with investors’ intuitive: Sharpe 
Ratio and Information Ratio have significant positive predictive power for funds with Growth 
or Growth and Income objectives, which put more weight on return stability. Meanwhile, the 
power of prediction is very weak for funds with Aggressive Growth object. Since Aggressive 
Growth funds are more likely to expand their return volatility (or idiosyncratic volatility) for 
a higher profit.  
This paper also contributes to the body of literature by introducing reliable predictor for 
expected returns conditional on fund idiosyncratic risk. Although fund alpha or idiosyncratic 
risk alone shows little predictive power for future returns in the whole sample, we do 
document that alpha positively predicts returns for low idiosyncratic risk funds. And 
predictive power is quite significant. My argument is that alpha proxies mutual fund 
managers’ investment capability. For low idiosyncratic risk funds, high alpha may represent 
outstanding capability for investment, and low alpha indicates unskilled in investing. Funds 
with low idiosyncratic risk and high alpha successfully keep their excellent performance for a 
long period. In addition, funds with low idiosyncratic risk and low alpha keep 
underperforming their peers with high idiosyncratic risk. On the other hand, high 
idiosyncratic risk funds’ performance is more likely to reverse: expected returns are low for 
high alpha funds, and low alpha funds’ expected returns are high. Instead of cautious stock 
selection, they expand the idiosyncratic risk exposure to seize profit opportunity. I further 
prove that most of their performance is due to luck. 
                                                            
5 The whole sample is divided into 3 styles: Aggressive Growth, Growth and Growth and Income, based on their 
investment objective. 4 
 
2.  Related Researches and Literature 
 
A lot of previous researches have searched predictors for expected fund returns. Amihud and 
Goyenko (2009) argue that R square measures the selectivity of mutual funds, thus predict 
expected returns negatively. Brands, Brown and Gallagher (2005) studies the Australian 
stock market; they also find that expected returns are positively correlated with their 
divergence index. Cremers and Petajisto (2009) create a proxy called “Active Share”, which 
counts the share of the portfolio holding that differ from the benchmark index holding. They 
further document that their “Active Share” predict fund performance positively. Wermers 
(2003) documents that the standard deviation of S&P 500-adjusted fund returns are positively 
related to the contemporaneous fund performance, measured by 4-factor alpha.  
The argument behind these predictors is that active management of the mutual funds is 
valuable. Fund selectivity is shown to enhance performance. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers( 1997) analyze selectivity at the equity level, and they find that securities that are 
picked by funds averagely outperform a characteristic-based benchmark, although the gain 
from stock picking approximately equals their management fee in average. Chen, Jegadeesh 
and Wermers (2000) study the stock holding and turnover of mutual funds. Their finding is 
that stocks widely held by mutual fund do not outperform others. However, stocks purchased 
by funds have significant better performance then they sell. Wermers (2000) finds that the 
average U.S. domestic equity fund underperforms its overall market, size, book-to-market, 
and momentum benchmarks by 1.2% per year over the 1975-1994 periods. More optimistic 
evidence in support of active management skills is shown in recent studies: Moskowitz (2000) 
provides evidence on the value of active management during different phases of the business 
cycle. He demonstrates that active strategy generates additional 6% per year during economic 5 
 
recessions versus expansions. Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) suggest that funds 
exhibit superior performance if they present greater industry concentration for their holdings 
compared to the diversified portfolio. One step further, Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) 
document that funds whose stocks holdings are highly related to company specific 
information from analysts’ expectations have better performance. 
These studies believe that investors could examine the quality of fund managers by studying 
their actions. Active management is sound proxy for investment capability and ambition. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) support this idea by studying the relationship between fund 
performance and fund managers’ characters. They argue that most of the performance can be 
attribute to the behavior of managers instead of their static characters. However, their 
previous paper in 1997 also argues that the risk taking behavior of fund managers may simply 
the response for incentives.  
Some other researches insist that mutual funds’ high risk exposure is a natural response for 
their managerial incentives. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) apply a semi-parametric model to 
study this potential agency conflict issue. Their argument is that the investors and mutual 
fund companies bear different investment objectives: investors care both return and risk 
exposure, while company does not charge on risk controlling but only on the profit they 
earned. In this case, it is a natural response that mutual fund managers may manually expand 
their idiosyncratic risk. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) find supporting evidence for this: 
they argue that the competition among the fund managers determines their fundamental 
payment; therefore the bad performers have incentive to expand risk exposure in the second 
half of fiscal year to catch up with peers on the market. Berk and Green (2004) develop a 
rational equivalent model on mutual fund performance. They suggest that mutual fund would 
expand their return volatility after experiencing fund outflows. Alexander, Cici and Gibson 
(2007) further unveil mutual fund managers’ investment motivations: a fund manager who 6 
 
buys stocks when there are heavy investor outflows is likely to be motivated by the belief that 
the stocks are significantly undervalued. In contrast, when there are heavy inflows, the 
managers are likely to be motivated to work off excess liquidity by buying stocks. Their 
argument supports the tournament effect hypothesis by proving that fund manager is better in 
investment under pressure. 
The studies on hedge fund find similar evidence in support of active management. Titman 
and Tiu (2008) suggest that hedge funds have better performance when they hedge less 
against common stock benchmarks on the market. And they conclude that choosing smaller 
instead of larger exposure to pricing factor risk may reflect fund managers’ confidence in 
their investment capability. Wang and Zheng (2008) define  2
2



  as the “hedge fund 
distinctiveness index,” they argue that the index they develop may proxy the investment 
capability of hedge fund managers. 
Although a lot of empirical evidence has been documented to support the existence of 
investment ability of mutual fund managers, a huge body of researches finds little evidence 
on this. Some papers even document negative alpha after controlling the transaction cost and 
management expenses. Jensen (1968) and Elton et al. (1993) document that averagely mutual 
fund alpha is significantly negative. Carhart (1997) argues that the superior performance for 
some mutual fund measured by Fama-French 3-factor alpha
6  could be explained by his 
momentum factor. He revisit the sample in previous researches with his new momentum 
benchmark model, and find little evidence in support of significant risk adjusted returns.  He 
also concludes that fund alpha computed by 4-factor model is powerless in predicting 
expected returns. 
                                                            
6 The 3 factors included are RM-Rf (the market portfolio excess return), SMB (small minus big size stocks), 
HML (high minus low book-to-market ratio stocks) 7 
 
Some empirical researches also support this idea by studying the fund managers’ trading 
behavior. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that institutional investors are 
frequently alleged to herd and to follow potentially destabilizing investment strategies. Sias 
(2004) documents the herding pattern among institutional investors. Badrinath and Wahal 
(2001) study the quarterly share holding by institutions, and find that institutions act as a 
momentum trader when entering the market, as a contrarian when they quit. 
Latest researches have set up the criteria and studied the investment capability directly by 
capturing their performance distribution. Barras, Scaillet and Wermer (2010) develop a new 
method to control “false discoveries” issues or mutual fund that exhibit significant alphas by 
luck alone. With their technique, most of the funds earn zero alpha all though the sample 
period. The proportion of skilled fund manager is not significant from zero. The returns for 
more than 23% funds in the sample cannot cover their trading cost and management expenses, 
thus exhibit significant negative alphas. They further suggest that Aggressive Growth funds 
in average perform better due to their active investment strategy. 
All the papers above apply the same assumption on fund managers’ capability that predictors 
they found work for all the institutional investors, thus cannot explain the confliction on the 
existence of skilled fund managers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
 
3.  Data and Sample Selection 
 
Data about mutual fund returns is downloaded from CRSP Survivorship Bias free Mutual 
Fund database for 1965 to 2007 periods. It is on monthly basis, and reports the net monthly 
return for all classes of each mutual fund
7. The CRSP database identifies each share class 
separately, whereas this paper only studies the performance for underlying funds. The Mutual 
Fund Links tables assign each share class to the underlying fund. We calculate mutual fund 
returns by taking the value weighted average over Total Net Asset across all the classes in 
that fund for each month. If Total Net Asset (TNA hereafter) is not available for some classes, 
fund return equals to the class returns with largest Total Net Asset. We take the simple 
average of the class returns when the TNA is missing for all the classes of that fund. The 
return file has been merged to MFLINK (which is available from CRSP) to include the fund 
characters, like investment objectives, fund age, expenses ratio and turnover. Investment 
objectives are jointly determined by S&P investment objective code, ICDI investment 
objective code and CRSP investment code. Most of the funds in our sample report these 
characters on quarterly basis. Expenses ratio, investment objectives and 12b1 fees are 
annually reported before 1999. And quarterly data is available since 1999 onward
8. However 
we apply the annual data by simply taking the last observation in each fiscal year
9. The alpha 
for Carhart’s momentum based model is used to estimate the benchmark adjusted 
performance. The monthly 4 factors are collected from Ken French’s website. 
Actively managed equity funds are analyzed in this paper. Included are funds with investment 
objective codes from CRSP to be Small Company Growth, Other Aggressive Growth, 
                                                            
7The net return we use is after fees, expenses,and brokerage commissions but before any front-end or back-end 
loads. 
8 See Cici (2008) for more detailed explanations. 
9 Usually we take the fourth quarter data for each fiscal year. If the fourth quarter is missing, we will take the 
third quarter instead, and so on. 9 
 
Growth, Income, Growth and Income, Maximum Capital Gains
10. If no code is available for a 
fund-year and a fund has a past year with the style identified, that fund-year is assigned the 
style of the previously identified style-year. If no fund style is identified, it is not included in 
our sample. As mentioned in Section 2, roughly we classify the funds into three categories: 
Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and Income based on their investment strategies. The 
similar classification is also shown in Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010). Elton, Gruber and 
Blake (1996) and Amihud and Goyenko (2009) eliminate funds with total net assets of less 
than 15 million U.S.D. at the end of the year preceding the test year. They believe that the 
inclusion of such funds can cause survivorship bias in estimation due to reporting 
conventions
11. Still a lot of papers have introduced winsorizing method to include this 
consideration. This paper sheds light on both of these two treatments: the result is calculated 
in both settings, and we find the return difference is not fundamental for our findings. In this 
paper we only report the result after winsorizing top and bottom 0.5% TNAs. Besides that we 
require funds to have at least cumulative 36 monthly returns data to be eligible in our sample, 
since we have to use them to estimate lagged values of alpha and idiosyncratic risk. We also 
require funds to have data in the first year about expenses, turnover, total net assets, age and 
managerial tenure
12.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 See Pastor and Stambaugh (2002) for more details. 
11 Their argument is that the extremely small fund is probably to be out of market in the next year after the 
observation. 
12 Age counts the years since the funds is public tradable. And managerial tenure equals to the number of years 
since the incumbent manager take control of the fund. 10 
 
4.  Research Method 
 
This paper studies the predictive power of Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio, and fund 
alpha conditional on idiosyncratic risk level. For the funds that satisfy the requirement in 
section 3, we estimate fund alpha and idiosyncratic risk by regressing the past 36 months’ 
excess returns
13 on Carhart’s four factors
14 for all the funds separately.  
 
r ,   r f    α    β  ,   M k t r f    β  ,   H M L    β  ,   S M B    ε  ,  
Idiosyncratic risk     ε  
 
N
   
 
 
Fund alpha is the intercept of this regression, and idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the 
standard error of the residuals. The sigma measures the return volatility for the past 36 
months. 
We have two conventional methods to study the predictive power of these ratios and 
characters. Firstly we use investment based method to form portfolios in each month based 
on funds’ past characters, and hold the portfolio for one month or one year.  
 
                                                            
13 Fund return over risk free rate. 
14 It includes RM-RF (market portfolio excess returns), SMB (small minus big size stocks), HML (high minus 
low book-to-market ratio stocks) and UMD (winner minus loser stocks). 11 
 
Ret     r  , 
N 
   
T
   
 
 
The portfolio analysis technique is widely employed to study the spread of expected returns 
between different groups. Investors could buy one share of top portfolio and short one share 
of the bottom portfolio to earn the profit of this spread. The significant returns of this 
portfolio help to identify the predictive powers for the fund characters. In the second place we 
could also reveal the predictive pattern by employing Fama-MacBeth’s setting
15, which is a 
two-step process:  we first regress the expected returns on fund characters in the first 36 
months. Then we split the sample based on their factor loadings, and study the average of the 
loadings. In each month, Fama-MacBeth regression specifies cross-sectional regression that 
future one month return is regressed on current characters. We take the simple average of the 
coefficient all through every month in the sample period. 
 
r ,   a    b    c h a r a c t e r  ,     ε  ,  
B  b  
T
   
 
 
For portfolio analysis, we rank all resulting fund characters estimates into ten portfolios based 
on fund alpha, idiosyncratic risk, past return, funds’ R square, Sharpe Ratio and Information 
Ratio, and winsorize the top and bottom 0.5% of the observations. We report the result for 
                                                            
15 See Fama and MacBeth (1973) for more details. 12 
 
both monthly and annually portfolio rebalance
16, and include these characters and ratios in 
cross-sectional regressions. Additionally the control variables in the predictive cross-fund 
regression are those that are commonly introduced by previous studies of fund performance: 
Amihud and Goyenko (2009) introduce fund age (year), expenses, the expenses ratio 
calculated in the latest fiscal year, Total Net Asset (TNAM hereafter), turnover, defined as 
the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities divided by the 
average 12-month TNA of the fund, and managers’ tenure
17 into this regression to check the 
robustness of our result. The predictors studied in this paper are alpha and idiosyncratic risk. 
They reflect mutual fund managers’ investment skill and strategy. 
Neither Sharpe Ratio nor Information Ratio exhibit significant predictive power in the whole 
sample. However they show clear predictive patterns in sub-samples. We divide the whole 
sample into three categories by funds’ investment objectives: Aggressive Growth, Growth, 
Growth and Income. And Fama-MacBeth’s technique is employed in each category to study 
the predictive power of Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio: R square measures the selection 
sensitivity, alpha proxy the past performance, Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio combine 
profit earning and risk controlling, thus are the fundamental predictor in this paper. Our 
argument is that these ratios may proxy fund managers’ investment skills. 
One contribution of this paper is that we reveal the predictive power of fund alpha 
conditional on funds’ idiosyncratic risk level. We further re-do our portfolio analysis and 
divide the sample into 5*5 portfolios classified by funds’ alpha*idiosyncratic risk. The low 
and high idiosyncratic risk groups indeed show inverse pattern on the predictive power of 
past alpha. In addition, we employ Fama-MacBeth technique in each of the sub-samples, and 
                                                            
16 Monthly rebalance requires to renew the portfolio formation in each month, and to hold the new portfolio for 
one month. Annually rebalance only renew the portfolio at the end of year, and holds the portfolio for the next 
12 months. 
17 It counts the years since current manager took his position. 13 
 
the inverse factor loadings strengthen our findings that the predictive power of alpha has 
changed fundamentally from low idiosyncratic risk funds to high idiosyncratic risk funds.  
In the end we conclude our findings that fund alpha may represent the investment capability 
for funds with low idiosyncratic risk, which indicates that high alpha and low idiosyncratic 
risk funds may possess superior ability to select the stocks, while low alpha and low 
idiosyncratic risk funds keep their underperformance comparing with benchmark. In the other 
way, it is hard to identify the investment capability for high idiosyncratic risk funds. It is still 
an open question on how to separate the active management from risk expanding simply due 
to interest conflicts. To assess the capability of fund managers, we apply Barras, Scaillet and 
Wermers (2010)’s technique for three sub-groups: low alpha and low idiosyncratic risk funds, 
high alpha and low idiosyncratic risk funds, and high idiosyncratic risk funds. We document 
that the proportion of zero-alpha fund is highest among high idiosyncratic risk funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
 
5.  Result and Analysis 
 
We summarize the basic sample statistics in table 1. Most funds charge reasonable expenses 
ratios around 1.1%, and Aggressive Growth funds in average charge higher expenses over 
Growth, Growth and Income funds. Fund alpha is negative in average calculated with past 3 
years excess returns, this result is consistent with a lot of previous empirical findings (e.g. 
Amihud and Goyenko (2009) document negative fund alpha with daily data). However, the 
average raw return for mutual fund is significantly positive, and mutual funds will typically 
profit 0.5% per month. The ratio of idiosyncratic risk over the return volatility is around 1/3 
for most of funds in our sample. And a majority of funds usually rebalance all the positions 
they hold in 3 to 4 months. It should be noticed that in each month we remove the 
observations with lowest 1% TNAM, to make sure that our result is not driven by some 
extremely small institutes. 
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
5.1 The prediction of Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio  
 
We paint a brief portrait for the control variables in our sample by studying their correlations. 
Table 2 presents the Spearman correlation between the fund characters and variables. It is 
interesting to find that R square is negative correlated with excess return (mretn). This is 
consistent with Amihud’s result which documents a negative relation between expected alpha 
and current R square. Table 2 presents the correlation for variable in the same month. There 
is no prediction pattern in the whole calculation. The correlation we present here is consistent 15 
 
with previous studies: the expenses ratio is positively correlated with mutual fund’s turnover, 
and it is significant all through the sample period. Since aggressive growth funds are more 
likely to take active investment strategies, and in average they charge higher expense ratio for 
their management. The age of the funds is positive correlated with fund’s total net asset, 
which means the older the fund is, the larger it should be. Besides that, fund’s TNA is 
negatively correlated with turnover ratio and past returns, but positively related with R square, 
which reveals that bigger funds tend to converge to passive investment strategies, thus have 
worse performance comparing with smaller funds, which have the incentive to employ more 
aggressive strategies. Therefore the positive correlation with R square is intuitive that larger 
funds may prefer the stable investment strategies which put more weight on market portfolio.  
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
 
5.1.1 Predictive power in full sample 
 
To examine the predictive power of fund characters, we employ the investment based 
strategy. In each month we single sort the sample on past characters and hold the portfolios 
for one month. Then we have 10 portfolios, which are ten continuous time series. We keep 
the equally weighted average returns as the mean performance of the portfolios, and 
introduce Carhart’s 4 factors on monthly basis to compute the risk adjusted returns. Two 
methods are employed to form the portfolios: the one is to rebalance the portfolio in every 
month and hold the portfolio for future one month; the other is only to rebalance the portfolio 
at the end of each year, and to hold the portfolio for the future twelve months. The annually 16 
 
rebalance result is more consistent with result for Fama-MacBeth regression, in which many 
fund characters are only available in annual basis
18. 
 
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Panel 1 reports the result for single sort on past alpha. It is consistent with previous research 
that 4 factor alpha does not predict future returns in ordinary linear settings. The return spread 
is only around 0.0013 per month, with its t-statistic 0.33. This pattern is stable whether we 
employ monthly or annually rebalance portfolios and is persistent across raw return and risk 
adjusted returns. In panel 2 we sort on past idiosyncratic risk, again we find that each group 
earns significant positive raw returns and none significant risk adjusted returns. The result 
does not change too much for yearly rebalance. The pattern for return spread is vague that 
semi-significant profit is documented by longing one share of the highest idiosyncratic risk 
portfolio and shorting one share of the lowest. And the result is the same when we turn to 
annually rebalancing. However, the risk adjusted return adds little to this finding. There is 
insignificant spread when we look at monthly/annually rebalanced alpha. Panel 3 sorts funds 
based on past R square. It is a contradiction that we do not find clear predictive power for R 
square
19. We document positive prediction, and the t-statistic equals 1.45, which indicates 
semi significant relation. This pattern is reversed when we study the risk adjusted returns.  
Similar patterns are observed when we sort the funds based on ratio1 and ratio2
20. Averagely 
neither information ratio nor Sharpe ratio is clearly correlated with expected return in the 
whole sample. Therefore, an easy conclusion is that none of these fund characters has strong 
                                                            
18 Fund expenses, total net asset is only available at the end of year for most of funds. 
19 Amihud and Goyenko (2009) document negative predictions for R square. 
20 Ratio1 is information ratio, which is alpha over idiosyncratic risk; ratio2 is alpha over return volatility. 17 
 
predictive power for expected returns, including information ratio and Sharpe ratio. The 
factor loadings from Fama-MacBeth regression support similar patterns
21. 
5.1.2 Predictive power in sub-samples 
 
The first contribution of this paper is that we study fund characters’ predictive power within 
sub-samples, which is categorized based on investment objective. Although little predictive 
power has been documented in full sample, information ratio and Sharpe ratio could still be 
useful in forecasting future performance in sub-samples. It is common that researchers find 
weak or minor evidence in the full sample, since it includes all types of institutions and a lot 
of investment strategies. The factor loadings may be negative for some specific institutions, 
while positive for some others. Therefore, the general picture is veiled by the co-existence of 
many different patterns. Therefore the helpful as well as critical routine to study the 
predictive power is to divide the full samples into different sub-samples, and find different 
patterns of prediction in sub-samples. This paper divides the sample based on their 
investment objectives (IOB hereafter). IOB is one of the most consistent characters of the 
mutual funds. It is stable all through many years in funds’ life, thus it is reliable proxy for 
their investment strategies. The predictive power of information ratio and Sharpe ratio may 
vary across different investment objectives: funds which employ aggressive strategies pay 
more attention to investment opportunities instead of risk controlling. Actually they often 
manually expand risk exposure to bet for better expected returns. Meanwhile funds with 
passive strategies may prefer low risk bearing portfolios. So our hypothesis is that 
information ratio and Sharpe ratio predict returns positively in samples which employ less 
aggressive strategies, and negatively in aggressive samples.  
                                                            
21 The result of Fama-MacBeth regression also finds little evidence for fund characters’ predictive power.  
Therefore it is not reported in this paper. It is available upon request. 18 
 
Previous researches typically categorize the fund investment objectives into three types: 
Aggressive Growth, Growth, Growth and Income. Aggressive Growth funds are actively 
managed to search investment opportunities, thus bear higher risk exposure. Growth, Growth 
and Income funds manage their portfolios to invest on valuable assets. Usually they pay more 
attention on risk controlling than Aggressive Growth funds, which earn profit by expanding 
risk exposure. In this paper we find comprehensive evidence that information ratio is useful 
in predicting expected returns for Growth, Growth and Income fund. Since these institutions 
combines their profit earning and risk management goals in their value investment. Instead, 
future returns are negatively predicted by information ratio for Aggressive Growth funds, to 
which risk controlling may border their profit earning plans.  
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
Model 4 introduces R square, information ratio and past risk adjusted returns into the 
regression
22. R square, as mentioned in Amihud and Goyenko (2009), proxies the active 
management, thus adds value to the prediction of expected returns. We notice that none of the 
factors introduced is significant in predicting the expected return. Both R square and 
Information ratio are negatively correlated with future returns for funds with aggressive 
growth objective, but the absolute value of t-statistic does not exceed 2. Therefore we could 
only suggest that active management may possibly increase the performance, and information 
ratio is not very sound a proxy for the investment skills for aggressive growth funds. 
However, neither of these two hypotheses could be verified. 
                                                            
22 The result is also available for regression on both predictive factors and fund characters. Since it is consistent 
with each other, we only report the result for regression on predictive factors. The full regression is available 
upon request. 19 
 
Meanwhile the predictive power of information ratio is significant for Growth funds and 
Growth and Income funds. Although R square and past alpha still do not show clear 
predictive patterns under this setting: their t-statistics are less than 1 in average, the 
coefficients of information ratio are positive significant in both panel 2 and 3. 
5.2 Conditional predictors for expected returns 
 
5.2.1 Investment based analysis 
 
The other contribution of this paper is that we find a conditional predictor for future 
performance. Although none of fund characters presents significant predictive power for all 
conditions, we do document some evidence by splitting the sample into two dimensions: past 
performance and past idiosyncratic risk exposure. Table 5 divides the whole sample into 5*5 
portfolios based on past alpha and past idiosyncratic risk. We find that averagely funds with 
high idiosyncratic risk earn better performance over funds with low idiosyncratic risk. This is 
consistent with a lot of previous research. Also it is consistent with our single sort result. 
When we focus on the funds with low idiosyncratic risk, high alpha funds maintain the stable 
and premium performance over funds with low alpha, which maintain the stable but inferior 
performance. On the other hand, we have observed reverse pattern for funds with high 
idiosyncratic risk: funds with low alpha in the past 3 years generally outperform their 
counterparts with high alpha. Although these patterns are weaker when we consider the risk 
adjusted returns, we still find that the return spread is persistent. So we have the first 
hypothesis on the predictive characters: alpha could be a sound predictor conditioning on 
idiosyncratic risk exposure. Fund’s alpha positively predicts future returns when low 
idiosyncratic risk is presented. Additionally, alpha may not predict expected returns quite 
well when funds show high idiosyncratic risk exposure. To be noticed, for low alpha funds, 
the group with low idiosyncratic consistently underperforms the peers with high idiosyncratic 20 
 
risk. However this pattern reverses for funds with high alpha: funds with low idiosyncratic 
risk outperform high idiosyncratic funds. So we have the second hypothesis: alpha may 
represent the investment capability for fund managers whose idiosyncratic risk exposure is 
low, and alpha is powerless to proxy investment ability for funds with high idiosyncratic risk. 
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
 
This finding is confirmed by annual rebalancing result in Table 6. Clear outperformance 
patterns are documented for funds with high alpha and low idiosyncratic risk over low alpha 
low idiosyncratic risk funds. The spread portfolio which takes long position on low 
idiosyncratic risk high alpha funds and short position on low idiosyncratic risk low alpha 
funds earns 0.75% per month. The t-statistics is 2.03, which indicates significant profit. 
Besides that, we also get some evidence in support of that fund with low alpha and low 
idiosyncratic risk is unskilled: funds with high idiosyncratic risk and low alpha maintain the 
better performance over low idiosyncratic risk and low alpha funds. This result is consistent 
whether we employ raw returns or risk adjusted returns: high idiosyncratic risk & low alpha 
portfolio outperforms low idiosyncratic risk & low alpha portfolios by 0.93% for raw returns, 
and 0.18% for risk adjusted returns. Both are significant in statistical point of view. 
 
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
5.2.2 Regression analysis 
 21 
 
To test the two hypotheses mentioned above, we split the sample into two groups by two 
dimensions: panel 1 and panel 2 present the result for high alpha and low alpha groups 
respectively. We document clearly reversed patterns for the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk: 
it is quite significant that idiosyncratic risk predict negative expected returns within the group 
of high alpha funds: the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk is -0.0029 for models without 
controlling variables. And it is even more negative after controlling variables are introduced. 
In both models the t-statistics of the coefficients are negative significant. The reversal pattern 
is held for the coefficient of idiosyncratic risk for funds with low alpha. Again the t-statistics 
are significant. We then study the sub-sample of high and low idiosyncratic risk. And the 
result for two regressions in panel 3 and 4 are highly consistent with previous result for 
double sort: alpha is critical and reliable proxy for investment capability that it predicts the 
future return with high significance: for low idiosyncratic risk funds, the coefficient of alpha 
is positive significant whether controlling variables are introduced or not. The prediction role 
of alpha for high idiosyncratic risk funds is clouded by the extremely high risk exposure. May 
most of their superior (or inferior) performance be attributed to luck (or unlucky). 
 
[Insert table 7 here] 
 
5.2.3 Further evidence 
 
To further shed some light on the differences between low and high idiosyncratic risk funds. 
Figure 1 is presented to show the distribution of expected returns for two groups. 
 
[Insert figure 1 here] 22 
 
 
The expected returns of high idiosyncratic risk funds are more diversified: the probability of 
quintile 1, 2, and quintile 24, 25 exceed 0.05, and quintile 11, 12, 13 are only around 0.03. It 
is more likely to witness extreme returns for high idiosyncratic risk funds: the likelihood of 
extreme values (quintile 1, 2, 24, 25) is 22.8%. While the likelihood of extreme values for 
low idiosyncratic risk is around 8.9%. The distribution of low idiosyncratic risk funds’ 
expected returns is more converged to its mean value.  
The distinctive patterns shown in figure 1 are intuitive: high idiosyncratic risk funds 
manually expand risk exposure to bet for better performance. However, their aggressive 
strategies may not realize the better performance for sure. Some of them may be lucky 
enough to get extremely positive returns, while still some funds will unfortunately to accept 
the truth that they may lose a lot on expanding risk exposures.  In another way the extreme 
value for low idiosyncratic risk funds is very rare, which also indicates that the performance 
is quite stable among the low idiosyncratic risk funds. 
To verify the hypothesis that low idiosyncratic risk funds’ performance is truly more stable 
than high idiosyncratic risk funds, this paper plots the change of distribution of fund alpha in 
figure 2. 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
Panel 1a, b, c, d present the alpha distribution for low idiosyncratic risk funds, and panel 2a, b, 
c, d show this distribution for high idiosyncratic risk funds. Panel 2 pictures the drift of the 
alpha distribution after 1 year. We find that most of the low idiosyncratic risk funds stay in 23 
 
the same quintile after one year. 53% funds in the quintile 1 remain their rankings after one 
year. And similar patterns are founded for funds in quintile 2, 3, 4, 5. However, fewer high 
idiosyncratic risk funds stay in the same quintile after one year: only 32% funds in quintile 1 
keep their rankings in one year time. Again the same result is held for quintile 2, 3, 4, 5. 
Panel 2 shows alpha switch distribution in two years’ time. The distribution for three years is 
presented in panel 3.  Shown in panel 3b, we find that most of high idiosyncratic risk funds in 
quintile 1 have changed their rankings to quintile 5, and most of funds in quintile 5 have 
moved to quintile 1. This finding strengthens our conclusion that low idiosyncratic risk funds’ 
expected returns are more stable comparing with high idiosyncratic risk funds. 
Since low idiosyncratic risk funds’ performance is more reliable, we could place more credit 
on their past performance when we study the mutual funds’ investment capabilities. In 
another word, alpha could predict expected returns positively for funds with low idiosyncratic 
risk. This idea is similar with Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010) which divide the funds 
into three groups: unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled. In their paper, they indicate that there are 
three distributions in association with three types. And funds’ performance will be more 
consistent with their true distributions when they make this specification. They insist that a 
skilled fund is less likely to be identified as unskilled in their specifications comparing with 
in traditional hypothesis which assumes one general distribution for all the funds. The 
intuition of their story is that their division of the whole sample categories all funds into 
different types and funds’ performance will be more stable conditional on their types. 
Therefore, their estimation of funds’ performance is reduced biased estimation, and their test 
captures the true investment capability. 
This paper employs the methodology developed in their paper: assumes that there are 
unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled funds. We further divide the sample into three groups: funds 24 
 
with low alpha low idiosyncratic risk, high alpha low idiosyncratic risk and high idiosyncratic 
risk, and study the proportion of unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled funds in these groups. 
 
[Insert table 8 here] 
 
The proportion of skilled funds is lowest for low idiosyncratic risk low alpha funds. And the 
skilled funds proportion is not significant from zero. However, for low idiosyncratic risk high 
alpha funds and high idiosyncratic risk funds, the proportion of skilled funds is about the 
same: much higher than that for low idiosyncratic risk low alpha funds. In the end, the 
proportion of zero-alpha fund is highest for high idiosyncratic risk funds. 
5.3 Robust check 
 
The patterns we find in section 5.2 are true for sample period from 1965 to 2007’s 
observations on monthly basis. In each month, we calculate funds’ past alpha and 
idiosyncratic risk with a regression for past 36 months’ data. In this regression, past 36 
months’ excess returns regress on Carhart’s four factors. Funds’ alpha is the intercept of the 
regression; idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals.  
However, one may argue that the pattern we document above is valid only with the 
specification of this paper. To verify the robustness of the findings, we specify a second 
setting on sample period and on portfolio construction. Amihud and Goyenko (2009) use 
daily data for each month in the period 1989-2007 to calculate funds’ alpha and idiosyncratic 
risk. They specify the form of regressions to reveal that funds’ R square is negatively 
predictive for expected returns. In the robust check, we employ the same method to calculate 25 
 
funds’ alpha and idiosyncratic risk: In each year from 1999-200723, daily data is used to 
calculate the funds’ alpha and idiosyncratic risk. After that, funds’ alpha and idiosyncratic 
risk are ranked into 10 quintiles as in table 3. The result is shown in table 9. 
 
[Insert table 9 here] 
 
Model 1 presents the result for regular Carhart’s regression. Because we use daily data and 
because some stocks that constitute the fund returns are slow to adjust to information, we use 
model 2 where the fund return is regressed on the current and one-lag returns of the 
benchmark indexed24.  
Yearly rebalance presents similar pattern as shown in table 3: none of fund alpha, 
idiosyncratic risk, Information ratio or Sharpe ratio shows clear predictive power for future 
returns. However, R square indeed predicts returns negatively. In both model 1 and 2, this 
pattern is robust for both raw returns and risk adjusted returns. This is consistent with 
Amihud and Goyenko (2009)’s result. 
Similar with table 6, double sort result is presented in table 10. 
 
[Insert table 10 here] 
 
                                                            
23 Amihud’s sample is constituted with two sectors: daily data for 1989-1998, which is from a private database 
from International Finance Centre in Yale Business School; and daily data for 1999-2007, which is available 
from CRSP’s mutual fund file. Since the author of this paper only get access to CRSP, the sample in this paper 
is from 1999 to 2007. 
24 See Dimson (1979). 26 
 
For low idiosyncratic risk funds, the return spread is still significant between the high alpha 
and low alpha funds: the raw return spread is 0.71%, and the t-statistic is 2.02; the risk 
adjusted return spread is 0.19%, t-statistic is 2.10. Besides that, little evidence is founded to 
support other patterns. The return spread is positive for high idiosyncratic risk fund; however 
it is extremely insignificant. For low alpha funds, the return spread between high 
idiosyncratic risk funds and low idiosyncratic risk funds is positive. But t-statistic is only 1.39 
for raw return, 1.20 for risk adjusted return. Although little evidence can be revealed with this 
new setting, our basic patterns do not change: alpha indeed predict returns positively for low 
idiosyncratic risk funds. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we suggest a new view on the role of alpha and idiosyncratic risk in predicting 
mutual funds’ expected returns. The contribution of this paper is that we find predictive 
factors conditional on funds’ idiosyncratic risks. Our empirical evidence supports that alpha 
is a sound predictor for funds with low idiosyncratic risk. The further implement is that it is 
easier for investors to learn about the investment capability for funds with low idiosyncratic 
risk. Their performance is more stable comparing with high idiosyncratic risk funds. 
Therefore their alpha may proxy capability quite well. However little evidence is documented 
on the return prediction for funds with high idiosyncratic risk (no matter their past returns are 
high or low). The predictive factors may be veiled by the high risk exposure. We replicate 
Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010)’s method, and prove that the ratio of zero-alpha fund is 
highest for high idiosyncratic risk funds; skilled fund proportion is lowest for low 
idiosyncratic risk low alpha funds. 
Our work also reveals the role of information ratio in return prediction. For a long time 
investors measure the performance and capability of fund managers by information ratio. 
However many previous researches posit that high idiosyncratic risk represents active 
management of mutual funds, thus predicts better performance. The seemingly contradiction 
is reconciled after we split the sample into three groups based on their investment objectives. 
Idiosyncratic risk exposure may be a value added feature for Aggressive Growth funds, while 
for funds with more passive objectives; it may offset mutual fund managers’ effort to earn a 
higher profit. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Our sample covers the mutual fund data from January 1965 to December 2007. We download the data for 
mutual fund returns (meanret), expenses, turnover and management information for monthly pace.  Age counts 
the number of years since the fund is tradable in public, and tenure is the years since the incumbent management 
has taken control. For each fund, at least 36 months returns is required to be included in our sample. 
Idiosyncratic risk in every month is computed by regressing past 36 month returns on Carhart(1997)’s 4 factors, 
and take standard deviation of the residuals as idiosyncratic risk. Alpha is computed as the intercept of this 
regression, and the rsqua represents R square of the estimation. At last, ratio1 equals to alpha over idiosyncratic 
risk, ratio2 equals to alpha over the return standard error for past 36 months. Ratio3 represents past mean return 
over idiosyncratic risk, and ratio4 equals to past mean return over price standard error in past 36 months. 
 
mean median  maximum minimum 
expenses ( %)  1.2  1.16  7.89  0.01 
turnover(%) 81.24  58.9  3603  0.02 
TNAM(million) 1298.539 253.5631 102231.9 15.1 
age(year) 16.85163 11.78692 93  2 
tenure(year) 7.294158 6  46  1 
alpha -0.00013  -0.00036  0.053831  -0.03757 
idiosyncratic risk  0.016181 0.013577 0.261214  0.000195 
meanret 0.00528  0.006152 0.057181  -0.04848 
sigma 0.047446 0.04484  0.26471  0.000204 
ratio1 -0.03507  -0.03181  1.276934  -1.52589 
ratio2 -0.00576  -0.00938  0.817856  -1.47363 
ratio3 0.147477 0.155609 0.876452  -1.47488 
ratio4 0.483945 0.44428  7.78022  -5.63997 
rsqua 0.852426 0.894139 0.999045  0.00963 
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Table 2: Spearman correlation for the statistics 
We collect the data from CRSP mutual funds file. CRSP only report the fund returns and other information for different classes within the funds. So we take the value 
weighted average (weight on their Total Net Asset, TNAM hereafter) when computing the turnover, expenses, returns and other characters of the fund. For some funds with 
missing TNAM for their classes, we simply take these characters from the class with the highest TNAM. If none of the classes reports the TNAM, we take the simple average 
of all the classes. In the end, we include all the funds with a none-missing fundn_MSC, which is the unique identifier in MFLINK file in CRSP. This table presents a brief 
table on how these characters are correlated. 
 
 Spearman Correlation 
ratio1 ratio2 ratio3 ratio4  TNAM age  tenure  expenses  turnover  intercept  mretn rsqua 
ratio1  1  0.971545 0.269451 0.190274 0.085549 -0.05622 0.101369 -0.09648 -0.09471 0.953041 -0.01082 -0.16055 
ratio2  0.971545  1  0.277067 0.207906 0.099996 -0.05746 0.095868 -0.10975 -0.10345 0.973054 -0.00928 -0.08728 
ratio3  0.269451 0.277067  1  0.92922  0.115494 0.007259 0.093205 -0.12051  -0.1218  0.301488 0.134301  -0.0313 
ratio4  0.190274 0.207906  0.92922  1  0.155362 0.016406 0.071594 -0.17769  -0.14781  0.238633 0.127904 0.243563 
TNAM 0.085549 0.099996 0.115494  0.155362  1  0.35625  0.09771 -0.28466 -0.08221 0.098754 -0.00325 0.177323 
age -0.05622  -0.05746  0.007259  0.016406  0.35625  1  0.238353 -0.16876 -0.07159 -0.05112 -0.00014 0.037214 
tenure  0.101369 0.095868 0.093205  0.071594 0.09771 0.238353  1  -0.10248 -0.27583 0.099464 0.003493 -0.06617 
expenses -0.09648  -0.10975  -0.12051 -0.17769 -0.28466 -0.16876 -0.10248  1  0.238198 -0.10572 -0.01146  -0.2392 
turnover -0.09471 -0.10345  -0.1218 -0.14781 -0.08221 -0.07159 -0.27583 0.238198  1  -0.10723 -0.00487 -0.13853 
intercept 0.953041 0.973054 0.301488 0.238633 0.098754 -0.05112  0.099464  -0.10572  -0.10723 1 -0.01315  -0.08658 
mretn -0.01082  -0.00928  0.134301  0.127904  -0.00325  -0.00014 0.003493 -0.01146 -0.00487  -0.01315  1  0.018567 
rsqua  -0.16055  -0.08728  -0.0313  0.243563 0.177323 0.037214 -0.06617  -0.2392  -0.13853  -0.08658 0.018567  1 
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Table 3: Single-sort result on past characters 
We study all the domestic equity funds from 1965 to 2007. This table reports the result for portfolio analyze 
based on past characters. Idiosyncratic risk in every month is computed by regressing past 36 month returns on 
Carhart (1997)’s 4 factors, and take standard deviation of the residuals as idiosyncratic risk. Alpha is computed 
as the intercept of this regression, and the rsqua represents R square of the estimation. At last, ratio1 equals to 
alpha over idiosyncratic risk, ratio2 equals to alpha over the return standard error for past 36 months. For each 
panel we report the future one month returns in column 2. Column 4 presents the result for future one month 
alpha. The t statistics is listed right besides the estimations. In Column 2-5 we rebalance the portfolio in every 
month, and compute the expected returns for next month. Column 6-9 presents the result for annually rebalance, 
that is we only renew the portfolio at the end of a month, and keep the portfolio for a year. In every panel we 
report the result for ten subgroups and the spread between the top and bottom group. Panel 1 forms portfolios 
based on alpha computed by past 3 years’ data, panel 2 on past idiosyncratic risk, panel 3 on past R square, 
panel 4 on past alpha/idiosyncratic risk, panel 5 on past alpha/sigma, panel 6 on past returns. To remove the 
impact of price volatility for extremely small funds, we remove the return observation for the smallest funds in 
every month (bottom 1% in TNAM). All the raw return and alpha are computed with equal weighted average 
method. 
 
   Month     Year 
Panal 1: Single sort on alpha 
    ret  t-stat alpha t-stat     ret  t-stat alpha t-stat 
1 0.0055  2.55  -0.0005  -0.45 0.0068  2.68  -0.0015  -1.2 
2 0.0053  2.83  -0.0000  -0.05 0.0040  1.81  -0.0001  -0.06 
3  0.0042 2.46 0.0012 1.38  0.0032 1.68 -0.0004 -0.57 
4 0.0046  2.48  -0.0001  -0.16 0.0051  2.36  -0.0001  -0.2 
5 0.0041  2.26  -0.0002  -0.23 0.0047  2.58  0.0004  0.5 
6  0.0053 2.94 0.0006 0.96  0.0045 2.63 0.0004 0.63 
7 0.0027  1.42  -0.0014  -2.10 0.0041  2.18  0.0004  0.6 
8  0.0058 3.03 0.0014 1.96  0.0049 2.38 0.0002  0.4 
9  0.0047 2.25 0.0001 0.10  0.0045 2.00 0.0002 0.26 
10  0.0068 2.60 0.0006 0.57  0.0069 2.51 -0.0013 -1.43 
spread 0.0013 0.33 0.0011 0.89      0.0002 0.12 0.0001 0.13 
Panal 2: single sort on idiosyncratic risk 
1 0.0031  2.02  -0.0006  -0.7  0.0040  2.48  -0.0002  -0.25 
2  0.0044 2.52 0.0003 0.65  0.0041 2.24 0.0000 0.03 
3  0.0041 2.35  -0.0001  -0.26  0.0038  2.01 0.0001 0.17 
4  0.0053 2.83 0.0007 1.30  0.0045 2.32 0.0003 0.45 
5  0.0050 2.59  -0.0005  -0.77  0.0055  2.63 0.0007 1.01 
6  0.0049 2.61 0.0007 0.88  0.0055 2.79 0.0004 0.64 
7  0.0044 2.31 0.0016 1.67  0.0054 2.46 0.0004 0.59 
8  0.0061 2.91 0.0023 2.03  0.0047 2.02 0.0014 1.12 
9 0.0054  2.33  -0.0005  -0.49 0.0057  2.39  -0.0008  -0.7 
10 0.0061  2.26  -0.0012  -0.89  0.0076  2.66  -0.0014  -1.09 
spread 0.0030 1.40  -0.006 -0.75      0.0036 1.42 -0.0012 -0.7 
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Panal 3: single sort on R square 
1  0.0035 2.76 0.0004 0.44  0.0037 2.98 0.0009 0.95 
2  0.0044 2.31  -0.0002  -0.17  0.0063  2.73 0.0007 0.65 
3  0.0049 2.50 0.0007 0.80  0.0056 2.37 0.0007 0.73 
4  0.0072 3.53 0.0008 1.07  0.0053 2.22 -0.0007 -0.94 
5  0.0045 2.08 0.0000 0.04  0.0061 2.84 0.0008 1.21 
6 0.0065  3.18  -0.0008  -1.20 0.0061  2.57  -0.0005  -0.70 
7  0.0043 2.20 0.0006 0.96  0.0041 1.96 0.0007 0.95 
8 0.0051  2.53  -0.0006  -0.97 0.0047  2.25  0.0000  -0.08 
9  0.0042 2.18 0.0005 1.20  0.0030 1.47 -0.0001 -0.28 
10  0.0048 2.34 0.0002 0.46  0.0055 2.63 0.0000 0.04 
spread 0.0013 1.45 -0.0002 -0.29      0.0018 1.21 -0.0009 -1.05 
Panal 4: Single sort on Ratio1 
1 0.0048  2.10  -0.0004  -0.47 0.0058  2.28  -0.0019  -3.25 
2  0.0049 2.02 0.0006 0.80  0.0057 2.31 -0.0004 -0.5 
3 0.0051  2.06  -0.0001  -0.16 0.0056  2.18  -0.0010  -1.86 
4  0.0058 2.34 0.0010 1.14  0.0059 2.24 -0.0007 -1.54 
5  0.0057 2.25 0.0004 0.49  0.0057 2.11 -0.0008 -1.36 
6  0.0052 2.03 0.0002 0.37  0.0060 2.19 -0.0006 -1.12 
7 0.0063  2.34  -0.0006  -0.72 0.0064  2.25  -0.0012  -2.88 
8  0.0060 2.15 0.0005 0.74  0.0053 1.81 -0.0008 -1.59 
9  0.0054 1.82 0.0003 0.42  0.0048 1.59 -0.0014 -2.57 
10  0.0063 2.10 0.0000 0.04  0.0058 1.84 -0.0012 -1.73 
spread 0.0015 1.05 0.0005 0.17      0.0000 0.02 0.0007 0.74 
Panal 5: single sort on  Ratio2 
1  0.0045 2.01 0.0006 0.52  0.0058 2.35 -0.0020 -3.2 
2 0.0052  2.20  -0.0006  -0.65 0.0059  2.38  -0.0002  -0.3 
3  0.0051 2.08 0.0009 1.12  0.0054 2.13 -0.0011 -1.81 
4  0.0052 2.08 0.0011 1.63  0.0054 2.01 -0.0012 -2.51 
5  0.0057 2.22 0.0003 0.52  0.0061 2.28 -0.0002 -0.33 
6  0.0053 2.04 0.0007 1.13  0.0056 2.03 -0.0008 -1.65 
7  0.0055 2.01 0.0005 0.73  0.0057 1.99 -0.0006 -1.4 
8  0.0061 2.17 0.0003 0.37  0.0055 1.89 -0.0007 -1.51 
9 0.0053  1.79  -0.0002  -0.22 0.0055  1.79  -0.0020  -3.08 
10 0.0063  2.15  -0.0006  -0.54  0.0058  1.90  -0.0013  -2.02 
spread  0.0017 0.88  -0.0012  -0.66      0.0000  0.00 0.0007 0.71 37 
 
Table 4: Fama-MacBeth regression result for sub-samples. 
This table presents the regression result for 3 sub-samples based on investment objectives. The database we 
download from CRSP includes three investment objective identifiers: sp_obj_cd, obj and icdi_obj_cd. We 
identify the funds as Aggressive Growth when OBJ="AGG", icdi_obj_cd="AG", icdi_obj_cd="AGG", 
sp_obj_cd="AGG", as Growth when OBJ="SCG", sp_obj_cd="SCG", OBJ="G", OBJ="G-S", OBJ="S-G", 
OBJ="GRO", OBJ="LTG", icdi_obj_cd="LG", sp_obj_cd="GRO", OBJ="MCG", as Growth and Income when 
OBJ="I", OBJ="I-S", OBJ="IEQ", OBJ="ING", icdi_obj_cd="IN", sp_obj_cd="ING", OBJ="GCI", OBJ="G-I", 
OBJ="G-I-S", OBJ="G-S-I", OBJ="I-G", OBJ="I-G-S", OBJ="I-S-G", OBJ="S-G-I", OBJ="S-I-G", 
OBJ="GRI", icdi_obj_cd="GI", sp_obj_cd="GRI". We only report the factor loadings without control variable 
in this table: alpha is the intercept of the Carhart’s 4-factor regression, rsqua is the R square of the estimation. 
And ratio1 equals to alpha over idiosyncratic risk, ratio2 equals to alpha over the return standard error for past 
36 months. 
Panel 1: Aggressive Growth funds                         
      model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
      coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff.  t-stat 
rsqua      -0.0019 -0.43 -0.0021 -0.42 -0.0026 -0.62 -0.0025 -0.63 
ratio 1           -0.0007  -0.189 
ratio 2              -0.0125  -0.86 
alpha 0.102  0.92  0.095  0.9      0.187  0.95  0.372  1.31 
Panel 2: Growth funds                            
model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
      coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff.  t-stat 
rsqua     -0.003  -0.8  -0.0029  -0.72 -0.0022 -0.61 -0.0023 -0.69 
ratio 1           0.0084  2.27 
ratio 2              0.039  2.58 
alpha 0.114  0.94  0.086  0.77      -0.326  -1.26  -0.675  -1.68 
Panel 3: Growth & Income funds                         
model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4  model 5 
      coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff. t-stat coeff.  t-stat 
rsqua      0.0026 0.9 0.0028  0.94  0.0031  1  0.0021  0.71 
ratio 1           0.0027  1.79 
ratio 2              0.00021  0.041 
alpha     0.1  0.89  0.059  0.54        -0.12  -0.68  0.088  0.45 
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Table 5: Double-sort result on alpha and idiosyncratic risk, monthly rebalances 
This table presents the result for double sort on past alpha and past idiosyncratic risk. Alpha is calculated as the intercept of Carhart’s 4 factor regression; idiosyncratic risk 
equals the standard deviation of the regression residuals. In each month we split the whole sample into 5 subgroups based on past risk adjusted returns (alpha) and into 5 
equal subgroups based on their past idiosyncratic risk exposure. Overall we have 25 portfolios. Again we eliminate the impact of extremely small funds by removing the 
bottom 1% TNAM funds. For each 5 portfolios with the same alpha, we also report the spread of returns for high idiosyncratic risk and low idiosyncratic risk. For each 5 
portfolios with the same idiosyncratic risk, again the spread of returns is reported. Panel 1 presents the result for monthly raw return, which means we take the simple average 
of the returns at the end of each month, and hold the portfolio for a month. In Panel 2 risk adjusted returns are reported. We compute this by regressing the abnormal returns 
of each fund on Carhart (1997)’s 4 factors, and take the intercept of the regression. 
 
Panal 1: future raw return 
idiosyncratic 
risk       
   Bottom  t-stat  2  t-stat  3  t-stat  4 t-stat  Top  t-stat  Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom -0.0002  -0.12  0.0010  0.44  0.0038  1.71 0.0065  2.92 0.0081 3.23  0.0084  3.61 
2 0.0027  1.47  0.0035  1.78  0.0054  2.58  0.0068  3.06  0.0071  2.47  0.0044  1.98 
alpha 3  0.0030  1.65  0.0038  1.98  0.0067  3.28  0.0061  2.52  0.0046  1.51  0.0016  0.70 
4 0.0047  2.41  0.0049  2.49  0.0034  1.54  0.0040  1.68  0.0037  1.15  -0.0010  -0.38 
Top  0.0071  2.97  0.0082  3.29  0.0062 2.49  0.0047 1.96  0.0000  -0.01 -0.0072  -2.83 
top-bot  0.0074  3.10  0.0072  2.97  0.0024  0.99  -0.0018  -0.79  -0.0081  -2.85       
Panal 2: future alpha 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
Bottom t-stat  2  t-stat  3  t-stat  4  t-stat Top  t-stat Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom 0.0031 0.83  0.0038  1.01  0.0050  1.52 0.0070  2.11 0.0085  2.22  0.0054  1.59 
2 0.0046  1.59  0.0047  1.60  0.0059  1.95  0.0071  2.20  0.0083  2.23  0.0037  1.40 
alpha 3  0.0038  1.39  0.0045  1.64  0.0076  2.57  0.0077  2.25  0.0080  2.04  0.0042  1.17 
4 0.0050  2.00  0.0052  1.83  0.0048  1.44  0.0061  1.69  0.0056  1.19  0.0005  0.09 
Top 0.0073  3.13  0.0079  2.99  0.0066  2.11  0.0060  1.55  0.0033  0.55 -0.0040  -1.12 
top-bot 0.0041 1.22  0.0041  1.60  0.0016  1.29 -0.0010 -0.72  -0.0052  -1.57 39 
 
Table 6: Double-sort result on alpha and idiosyncratic risk, annually rebalance 
This table presents the result for double sort on past alpha and past idiosyncratic risk. Alpha is calculated as the intercept of Carhart’s 4 factor regression; idiosyncratic risk 
equals the standard deviation of the regression residuals. In each December we split the whole sample into 5 subgroups based on past risk adjusted returns and into 5 equal 
subgroups based on their past idiosyncratic risk exposure. Overall we have 25 portfolios. Again we eliminate the impact of extremely small funds by removing the bottom 1% 
TNAM funds. For each 5 portfolios with the same alpha, we also report the spread of returns for high idiosyncratic risk and low idiosyncratic risk. For each 5 portfolios with 
the same idiosyncratic risk, again the spread of returns is available. This table reports the result for annual rebalance. Comparing with table 4, we only renew the portfolio 
formation at December, and hold the portfolio for 12 months. Panel 1 presents the result for monthly raw return, which means we take the simple average of the returns for 
each month. In Panel 2 risk adjusted returns are reported. We compute this by regressing the abnormal returns of each fund on Carhart (1997)’s 4 factors, and take the 
intercept of the regression. 
Panal 1: future raw return 
idiosyncratic 
risk 
   Bottom  t-stat  2  t-stat  3  t-stat  4 t-stat  Top  t-stat  Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom  -0.0004  -0.18  0.0010  0.49  0.0042 1.87 0.0066 2.82 0.0089  3.43 0.0093  2.33 
2  0.0028 1.53 0.0041  2.02 0.0054  2.44 0.0068  2.72  0.0075 2.63 0.0047  1.91 
alpha  3  0.0031 1.63 0.0043  2.03 0.0065  3.34 0.0066  2.76  0.0044 1.43 0.0013  0.55 
4  0.0050 2.50 0.0050  2.36 0.0039  1.79 0.0046  1.83  0.0039 1.13 -0.0011  -0.35 
Top  0.0071 2.97 0.0077  3.17 0.0066  2.37 0.0051  2.15  0.0001 0.04 -0.0070  -1.98 
top-bot  0.0075 2.03 0.0066  2.18 0.0024  1.35 -0.0015 -0.87 -0.0088  -1.78         
Panal 2: future alpha                                     
idiosyncratic 
risk 
   Bottom  t-stat  2  t-stat  3  t-stat  4 t-stat  Top  t-stat  Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom  -0.0014  -0.87  -0.0010  -0.42  0.0001 0.08 0.0002 0.24 0.0004  0.29 0.0018  1.90 
2 -0.0007  -0.50  -0.0004  -0.19  -0.0017  -0.70 0.0007  0.68 0.0005 0.49 0.0013  0.98 
alpha 3  0.0000  -0.02  -0.0001  -0.10  0.0002  0.09 0.0002 0.25 -0.0002  -0.10  -0.0002 -0.14 
4 -0.0002  -0.09  -0.0006  -0.19  0.0016  0.44  0.0004 0.50 -0.0008  -0.44  -0.0006 -0.39 
Top  0.0004 0.46 0.0006  0.60  -0.0007 -0.41 -0.0011 -0.79 -0.0009  -0.43 -0.0012  -1.11 
top  0.0018 1.75 0.0016  1.11  -0.0007 -0.44  -0.0014  -1.31  -0.00125  -0.99       
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Table 7: The Fama-MacBeth Regression result for sub-samples based on past alpha and past idiosyncratic risk. 
In the left part of the table, we report the Fama-MacBeth regression coefficient for both high past alpha and low alpha. In each month, we rank the fund alpha into 3 
categories: High alpha, middle alpha and low alpha. This table only report the result for high/low alpha groups. Model 1 presents the result when we regress expected return 
on idiosyncratic risk alone. And model 2 introduces all the other controlling variables. Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the regression residuals from Carhart’s 4 
factor model. The fund characters are downloaded from CRSP mutual fund files: expenses proxy the 12-b-1 expenses ratio, age counts the years since the fund is tradable in 
the public, turnover is the proportion of the share holdings which are rebalanced. The coefficient of Log (TNAM) measures the sensitivity of expected returns on percentage 
change of Total Net Asset. The right side of the table presents the regression result for subsamples based on past idiosyncratic risk. We form 3 portfolios each month on past 
idiosyncratic risk exposure. This table only shortlists the coefficient for high/low idiosyncratic portfolios.  
Panel 1: High alpha group  Panel 3: High idiosyncratic group 
model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4 
coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat 
idio -0.0029  -2.64  -0.0045  -3.08 alpha  -0.099  -1.1  -0.134  -1.44 
expenses -0.089  -2.76  expenses  -0.115  -2.39 
age 2.86E-06  0.3  age  8.01E-06  -0.49 
turnover 0.00042  1.2  turnover  -0.00053  -1.29 
log(TNAM) 0.00105  2.39  log(TNAM)  0.00116  2.22 
log(TNAM)*log(TNAM) -0.000077  -2.44  log(TNAM)*log(TNAM)  -0.000092  -2.18 
obj 0.0013  1.64  obj  0.00136  1.3 
Panel 2: Low alpha group  Panel 4: Low idiosyncratic group 
model 1  model 2  model 3  model 4 
coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat  coeff. t-stat  coeff.  t-stat 
idio 0.0032  2.79  0.0042  3.14 alpha  0.123  3.35  0.078  2.69 
expenses -0.144  -3.75  expenses  -0.099  -4.68 
age -6.67E-06  -0.61  age  2.66E-06  0.38 
turnover -0.000057  -1.67  turnover  0.000095  0.37 
log(TNAM) 0.0006  1.21  log(TNAM)  0.00059  1.88 
log(TNAM)*log(TNAM) -0.000034  -0.86  log(TNAM)*log(TNAM)  -0.000031  -1.33 
obj 0.0013  1.33  obj  0.00079  1.17 41 
 
Table 8: Proportion of unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled funds  
Following Barras, Scaillet and Wermers (2010)’s method, this table presents the proportion of unskilled, zero-alpha and skilled funds for three groups: panel 1 shows the 
result for low idiosyncratic risk and low alpha funds, panel 2 for low idiosyncratic risk and high alpha funds, panel 3 for high idiosyncratic risk funds. In each panel, we 
report the estimated proportion of the significant funds in both left and right tail of the cross-sectional t-statistic distribution at three significance level (5%, 10%, 15%). In the 
leftmost columns, the significant group in the left tail is decomposed into unlucky and unskilled funds. In the rightmost columns, the significant group in the right tail is 
decomposed into lucky and skilled funds. Sigif is the proportion outside of the threshold, and it equals to the sum of unlucky and unskilled funds. 
 
Panel 1: low idio & low alpha funds 
   unskilled  zero-alpha  skilled    
30.90% 68.88% 0.22% 
   5%  10%  15%  15%  10%  5%    
sigif(%) 14.40  20.71  29.04 6.11 4.10 2.05  sigif(%) 
unlucky(%) 1.96  3.93  5.88  5.88  3.93  1.96  lucky(%) 
unskilled(%) 12.44  16.78  23.16  0.23  0.17  0.09  skilled(%) 
Panel 2: low idio & high alpha funds 
unskilled zero-alpha  skilled 
25.10% 73.30% 1.60% 
   5%  10%  15%  15%  10%  5%    
sigif(%) 12.75  17.99  24.24 7.45 4.94 2.28  sigif(%) 
unlucky(%) 1.96  3.93  5.88  5.88  3.93  1.96  lucky(%) 
unskilled(%) 10.79  14.06  18.36  1.57  1.01  0.32  skilled(%) 
Panel 3: high idio funds 
unskilled zero-alpha  skilled 
23.75% 74.74% 1.51% 
   5%  10%  15%  15%  10%  5%    
sigif(%) 12.70  17.47  23.66 7.37 4.94 2.35  sigif(%) 
unlucky(%) 1.96  3.93  5.88  5.88  3.93  1.96  lucky(%) 
unskilled(%) 10.74  13.54  17.78  1.49  1.01  0.39  skilled(%) 42 
 
Table 9: Single sort, yearly rebalance based on annualized alpha and idiosyncratic risks  
We study the mutual fund data on daily basis for sample period 01/1999-12/2007. In each year, we calculate the 
fund alpha, idiosyncratic risk and so on with the daily return data in that year. The daily Carhart’s 4 factors are 
also included to compute the risk adjusted returns. Alpha is the intercept for Carhart’s 4 factor regression, and 
idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of regression residuals. R square measures the soundness of the 
estimation. Amihud and Goyenko (2010) argue that R square proxies active management, thus predict better 
performance in the future. Ratio1 is information ration, and equals to alpha over idiosyncratic risk. Ratio2 is 
alpha over return volatility. We require at least 50 observations for each fund per year to be eligible in our 
sample since it should meet the minimum requirement for the regressions. After the fund characters are 
calculated we build portfolios based on these characters in each year. All through years 1999-2006, we split the 
sample into ten sub-groups on their alpha, idiosyncratic risk, information ratio or R square, and hold the 
portfolios for the next 12 months. This table reports both portfolio raw return and risk adjusted return. Since 
many previous researches argue that some stocks which constitute fund returns are slow to adjust to daily 
information, we also use in practice the model where the current return is regressed on both current factor and 
lag one term factors. The result is reported on the right side of the table. 
 
Model1     Model2 
Panal 1: Single sort on alpha 
    ret  t-stat alpha t-stat      ret  t-stat  alpha  t-stat 
1 0.0023  0.52  -0.0030  -1.99  0.0029  0.64  -0.0023  -1.39 
2 0.0025  0.60  -0.0018  -1.68  0.0029  0.70  -0.0010  -0.84 
3 0.0023  0.59  -0.0015  -1.97  0.0025  0.61  -0.0012  -1.32 
4 0.0026  0.68  -0.0008  -1.11  0.0027  0.69  -0.0008  -1.10 
5 0.0021  0.53  -0.0015  -2.67  0.0025  0.64  -0.0010  -1.48 
6 0.0026  0.67  -0.0008  -1.30  0.0024  0.62  -0.0010  -1.67 
7 0.0026  0.65  -0.0010  -1.59  0.0027  0.67  -0.0012  -1.87 
8 0.0031  0.73  -0.0011  -0.03  0.0030  0.72  -0.0014  -1.72 
9 0.0046  0.97  -0.0005  -0.47  0.0039  0.81  -0.0013  -1.16 
10  0.0055 0.90 0.0003 0.17  0.0045 0.74  -0.0010  -0.57 
spread  0.0031  0.91  0.0033  1.11     0.0016   0.44   0.0014  0.46  
Panal 2: single sort on idiosyncratic risk 
1 0.0013  0.37  -0.0007  -1.92  0.0013  0.40  -0.0007  -1.86 
2 0.0012  0.32  -0.0014  -3.76  0.0013  0.36  -0.0012  -3.28 
3 0.0021  0.59  -0.0010  -2.08  0.0020  0.55  -0.0011  -2.36 
4 0.0025  0.66  -0.0016  -2.86  0.0025  0.66  -0.0015  -2.67 
5 0.0035  0.91  -0.0007  -0.94  0.0036  0.94  -0.0007  -0.97 
6 0.0041  1.02  -0.0006  -0.85  0.0041  1.02  -0.0008  -0.95 
7 0.0044  1.01  -0.0009  -1.01  0.0043  0.98  -0.0011  -1.30 
8 0.0041  0.83  -0.0014  -1.36  0.0041  0.83  -0.0013  -1.25 
9 0.0048  0.84  -0.0009  -0.66  0.0046  0.83  -0.0010  -0.78 
10 0.0052  0.91  -0.0006  -1.68  0.0024  0.35  -0.0004  -1.58 
spread  0.0040  0.88  0.0001  0.58      0.0011   0.25  0.0003   0.70 
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Panal 3: single sort on R square 
1 0.0056  1.58  -0.0001  -0.12  0.0054  1.54  -0.0003  -0.46 
2 0.0061  1.43  -0.0005  -0.46  0.0062  1.45  -0.0003  -0.27 
3 0.0049  1.11  -0.0010  -0.95  0.0046  1.04  -0.0014  -1.31 
4 0.0042  0.90  -0.0017  -1.70  0.0043  0.93  -0.0012  -1.31 
5 0.0036  0.80  -0.0010  -1.25  0.0034  0.78  -0.0012  -1.45 
6 0.0024  0.53  -0.0018  -1.91  0.0023  0.51  -0.0019  -1.95 
7 0.0020  0.46  -0.0011  -1.12  0.0020  0.46  -0.0011  -1.18 
8 0.0010  0.24  -0.0017  -2.05  0.0011  0.26  -0.0016  -1.99 
9 0.0006  0.14  -0.0014  -2.61  0.0007  0.17  -0.0012  -2.42 
10 0.0006  0.15  -0.0012  -2.17  0.0007  0.17  -0.0011  -2.05 
spread -0.0050 -2.58 -0.0011 -2.20     -0.0047  -2.44  -0.0090   -2.03 
Panal 4: Single sort on Ratio1 
1 0.0022  0.55  -0.0018  -1.66  0.0024  0.59  -0.0016  -1.31 
2 0.0017  0.44  -0.0022  -2.46  0.0024  0.61  -0.0012  -1.06 
3 0.0021  0.51  -0.0019  -2.20  0.0022  0.53  -0.0015  -1.79 
4 0.0027  0.65  -0.0011  -1.22  0.0025  0.62  -0.0012  -1.35 
5 0.0025  0.60  -0.0013  -1.90  0.0029  0.70  -0.0008  -1.00 
6 0.0031  0.75  -0.0008  -1.08  0.0031  0.76  -0.0007  -1.09 
7 0.0035  0.83  -0.0005  -0.78  0.0029  0.69  -0.0012  -1.80 
8 0.0029  0.64  -0.0013  -1.59  0.0033  0.75  -0.0011  -1.28 
9 0.0037  0.80  -0.0011  -1.13  0.0034  0.72  -0.0017  -1.48 
10  0.0057 1.10 0.0003 0.21  0.0048 0.90  -0.0010  -1.65 
spread  0.0035  1.18  0.0021  0.81     0.0024    0.73  0.0007    0.31 
Panal 5: single sort on  Ratio2 
1 0.0027  0.70  -0.0025  -1.82  0.0030  0.76  -0.0021  -1.41 
2 0.0025  0.61  -0.0016  -1.62  0.0028  0.68  -0.0012  -1.06 
3 0.0024  0.58  -0.0014  -1.47  0.0028  0.66  -0.0007  -0.66 
4 0.0020  0.49  -0.0012  -1.68  0.0018  0.45  -0.0015  -1.98 
5 0.0018  0.44  -0.0016  -2.52  0.0025  0.60  -0.0008  -1.14 
6 0.0023  0.53  -0.0010  -1.47  0.0019  0.46  -0.0011  -1.66 
7 0.0026  0.60  -0.0008  -1.12  0.0022  0.51  -0.0014  -2.03 
8 0.0029  0.67  -0.0012  -1.43  0.0033  0.75  -0.0012  -1.44 
9 0.0043  0.90  -0.0009  -0.88  0.0039  0.82  -0.0015  -1.35 
10  0.0067 1.36 0.0006 0.47  0.0059 1.18  -0.0004  -0.25 
spread  0.0040  1.33  0.0031  1.14      0.0030   0.94   0.0018   0.82 
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Table 10: Double sort, yearly rebalance based on annualized alpha and idiosyncratic risks 
Similar with table 9 we calculate annualized fund alpha and idiosyncratic risk with the daily data in that year. Alpha equals to the intercept of the Carhart’s 4 factor regression, 
and idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the regression residuals. The sample is divided equally into 5*5 groups by their past alpha and idiosyncratic risk, and we 
hold the 25 portfolios for 12 months. Since the result for current factor regression and lag one term factor regression is consistent (as in table 9) we only report the result for 
current factor regression. 
 
Panel 1: future raw return 
idiosyncratic risk 
    Bottom  t-stat 2 t-stat 3 t-stat 4 t-stat  Top  t-stat  Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom -0.0013 -0.36 0.0018 0.49 0.0038 0.99 0.0047 1.06 0.0027 0.62  0.0040  1.39 
2  -0.0008 -0.24 0.0017 0.45 0.0043 1.13 0.0042 0.92 0.0052 0.94  0.0060  1.33 
alpha  3  0.0012 0.32 0.0012 0.31 0.0031 0.80 0.0034 0.78 0.0039 0.66  0.0027  0.72 
4  0.0021 0.60 0.0024 0.65 0.0023 0.57 0.0029 0.63 0.0041 0.71  0.0020  0.49 
Top  0.0058 1.52 0.0053 1.36 0.0052 1.26 0.0042 0.85 0.0038 0.57  -0.0020  -0.71 
top-bot  0.0071 2.02 0.0035 0.90 0.0014 0.17 -0.0005  -0.07 0.0011 0.55         
Panel 2: future alpha 
idiosyncratic risk 
    Bottom  t-stat 2 t-stat 3 t-stat 4 t-stat  Top  t-stat  Top-Bot  t-stat 
Bottom  -0.0016 -1.74 -0.0016 -1.73 -0.0015 -1.50 -0.0017 -1.29 -0.0009 -0.69 0.0007 1.20 
2  -0.0011 -2.34 -0.0016 -2.66 -0.0012 -1.42 -0.0018 -1.50 0.0002  0.11 0.0013 1.94 
alpha  3  -0.0012 -3.21 -0.0016 -2.81 -0.0009 -1.06 -0.0010 -1.16 -0.0011 -0.79 0.0001 0.49 
4  -0.0014 -2.74 -0.0013 -2.19 -0.0005 -0.68 -0.0018 -1.92 -0.0007 -0.51 0.0007 0.70 
Top 0.0003  0.32  -0.0008  -0.88  0.0004  0.42  -0.0001 -0.09 -0.0002 -0.10 -0.0004 -0.68 
        top-bot  0.0019 2.10 0.0009 0.94 0.0019 1.18 0.0016 0.88 0.0007 0.39         
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Figure 1: The distribution of expected returns 
In each month we split the sample into two parts: high idiosyncratic funds and low idiosyncratic risk funds. We 
study the expected raw return for each group by plotting the distribution of future expected returns. Firstly, we 
rank all expected returns into 25 portfolios (expected return is the return in future one month). For each fund in 
each month, its return in next month is categorized into one of the 25 portfolios. For each of 25 portfolios, we 
can get the number of fund & month observations. Finally we normalize the distribution of expected returns by 
dividing the number of each portfolio on the total fund & month observations. 
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Figure 2: Expected alpha distribution 
Panel a presents the drift of alpha distribution for 
low idiosyncratic risk funds. In each month, we 
match the realized alpha and expected alpha for 
each fund. Then, for each of the five rankings of 
realized alpha we have five expected alpha 
rankings. In the end, we normalized the distribution 
of expected alpha into 1. 
 
Panel 1a: Expected alpha distribution for low 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 6 months time span. 
 
Panel 2a: Expected alpha distribution for low 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 1 year time span. 
 
Panel 3a: Expected alpha distribution for low 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 2 years time span. 
 
 
 
Panel b presents the drift of alpha distribution for 
high idiosyncratic risk funds. In each month, we 
match the realized alpha and expected alpha for 
each fund. Then, for each of the five rankings of 
realized alpha we have five expected alpha 
rankings. In the end, we normalized the distribution 
of expected alpha into 1. 
 
Panel 1b: Expected alpha distribution for high 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 6 months time span. 
 
Panel 2b: Expected alpha distribution for high 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 1 year time span. 
 
Panel 3b: Expected alpha distribution for high 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 2 years time span. 
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Panel 4a: Expected alpha distribution for low 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 3 years time span. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel 4b: Expected alpha distribution for high 
idiosyncratic risk funds in 3 years time span. 
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